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Summary findings
Singh and Jun expand on earlier studies  of the determinants  Tests of the second hypothesis show that a general
of foreign direct investment (FDI)  by empirically  analyzing  qualitative index of business operation conditions is an
various factors - including political risk, business  important determinant of FDI in countries that receive
conditions, and macroeconomic variables  - that influence  high flows. This country group also shows a positive
direct investment  flows to developing countries.  relationship between taxes on international transactions
They try to fill a gap in the literature by examining  and FDI flows - supporting the "tariff hopping"
qualitative factors. Using a pooled model of developing  hypothesis.
countries, they test three groups of hypotheses on what  Results from tests of the third hypothesis reveal that
influences direct investment - that political risk matters,  exports generally, especially manufacturing exports, are a
that business conditions matter,  that macroeconomic  significant determinant of FDI flows for countries in
variables matter.  which FDI is high. This hypothesis is supported by
Tests of the first hypothesis indicate that a qualitative  standard regression analysis and by Granger causality
index of political risk is a significant determinant of FDI  tests, which indicate that the feedback is predominantly
flows for countries that have historically attracted  high  from exports to FDI.
FDI flows. For countries that have not attracted  such  Export orientation  is the strongest variable for
flows, sociopolitical instability (proxied by work hours  explaining why a country attracts FDI. This finding is in
lost in industrial disputes) has a negative impact on  line with the secular trend toward increasing
investment flows.  complementarity between trade and FDI.
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This  paper  analyses  three  empirical  issues  related  to  the  determinants  of  foreign  direct
investment (FDI) in developing countries:
*  What types  of sociopolitical instability are detrimental to FDI flows? Is there a  structural
difference between countries with high and low FDI flows?
*  Does the perception of favorable business operating conditions positively affect FDI flows?
Do taxes on international transactions impede FDI?
*  What type of exports (primary or manufacturing) are related to  FDI?  Do export oriented
economies attract FDI (exports precede FDI) or do inflows of FDI tend to increase exports
(FDI precedes exports)?
An analysis of these questions is particularly relevant because of the renewed interest in
FDI  as a viable  alternative for financing development.  The resurgence of interest  in  FDI is
primarily attributable to two sources.
First, as a recent World Bank report points out, the composition of private capital flows in
1990-93 shifted toward non-debt creating flows including FDI and portfolio equity investments'.
Average annual FDI flows to  developing countries between  1987-89 and  1990-93 have more
than doubled in nominal value.  The increase in FDI flows during the last two years (according to
available  data) has been quite dramatic: 28 percent between  1991 and  1992, followed by 42
percent increase  in  1992-93.  Moreover, developing countries at different income levels have
harnessed FDI, although middle-income countries have been relatively more successful than low-
income  countries in doing  so.  Sustainability is an issue in portfolio  investment, particularly
because  of  its  sensitivity  to  financial market  conditions.  In contrast,  FDI  flows driven  by
structural factors, such as the integration of global production, are expected to be relatively more
sustainable.  (World Bank 1995).
Second,  FDI  has  some  inherent  advantages  for  development:  risk  sharing,  market
discipline, export orientation, and the transfer of technology and managerial expertise. Recent
trends show that FDI can be an important and stable source of private capital for developing
economies, particularly countries that are able to create a hospitable environment for new foreign
investments.
World Debt Tables 94-95 ( pp: 7-24).
2The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  a  theoretical
underpinning of direct investment flows, followed by a review of previous empirical studies in
Section 3.  The next three sections deal with new empirical testing carried out  in this paper:
discussion of variables (Section 4); description of data (Section 5); and, presentation of empirical
results (Section 6).  Section 7 provides summary of findings and policy implications.
2.  Theoretical  Background
From a theoretical point of view, three questions dominate the FDI literature: 2
*  Why do national firms evolve into multinational organizations?
*  Why  do  firms  locate  production  in  a  foreign  country  rather  than  licensing  or
exporting?
*  What determines the geographic pattern of FDI flows? that is, on what basis are host
countries chosen?
The theoretical foundations addressing the first two questions are well developed.  As
Letto-Gillies's  (1992)  comprehensive  survey  points  out,  Hymer  (1960)  was  the  first  to
systematically  analyze  issues  relating  to  the  advantages  of  large  multinationals,  market
imperfections,  and  control.  Vernon  (1966)  built  on  the  technological  advantage  theories,
analyzing the strategic market implications of the product life cycle.  Vernon (1979) reevaluated
his own theory by indicating that multinational firms are now more geographically diffused than
the product cycle would warrant, and the cycle has shortened considerably.
Caves (1982) developed the rationale for horizontal integration (specialized intangible
assets with low marginal costs of expansion) and vertical integration (reduction of uncertainty
and  building  of  barriers  to  entry).  Buckley  and  Casson  (1976)  extended  Coase's  (1937)
explanation as to why multinationals internalize intermediate markets: internalizing intermediate
production processes reduces uncertainty by circumventing market imperfections.
But Dunning (1973, 1981) was the first to provide a more comprehensive analysis based
on  ownership,  location,  and  the  advantages  of  internalization.  Dunning's  eclectic  theory
provides some answers about the geographic distribution of FDI by analyzing location factors.
His  taxonomy  of  location  factors  emphasizes  possession  of  raw  materials,  labor  costs,
government incentives, and servicing of local markets.  Dunning's model has been criticized for
being tautological: it provides a taxonomy for a wide variety of variables that may be important.
But the taxonomy does not provide theoretical justification  of why certain location factors are
important.
2 Recent studies -- for example, Fry (1993) -- have also looked into the question of the effects (specifically, spillovers) of FDI.
3Lucas (1993) analyzed FDI based on a traditional derived-factor demand of a multiple-
product  monopolist.  But  because his  model  is  based  on  orthodox  neoclassical  foundations,
potentially important variables other than the cost of capital and labor (such as a proxy for the
size of the market) are not included in the analysis.
Casson (1990) has suggested that the theory of FDI is a "logical intersection" of three
distinct theories:  the theory of international capital markets, which explains the  financing and
risk-sharing arrangements; the theory of the firm, which describes the location of  headquarters,
management, and input utilization; and trade theory, which describes location of production and
destination of sales.  Although each theory provides some insight about the complexity of FDI
flows, an integrated theory that combines these elements in an analytically persuasive way has
not been developed.
The  empirical  investigation  in  this  paper focuses  on  the  macroeconomic  and  socio-
political  determinants  that influence the geographic distribution of FDI  flows.  There  are no
simple models or strong theoretical foundations to guide an empirical analysis of these issues.
However, the results of past studies are employed as an imperfect, but useful guide.
3.  Recent Empirical Studies
The literature on the determinants of FDI flows based on diverse methodologies is extensive and
controversial.  Empirical studies that evaluate the determinants of in-bound FDI are generally
based  on  three  approaches:  micro-oriented  econometric  study,  survey  data  analysis,  and
aggregate econometric analysis.  A comprehensive survey of the determinants of FDI based on
different methodologies is provided in Pearce, Islam, and Sauvant (1992).  A brief technical note
discusses the pros and cons of each methodology (Appendix II).
Because each approach has its limitations and advantages, methodological pluralism  is
desirable.  One way that we can check the robustness of our results is to  run the same issue
through different methodological filters.  This study approaches the issue at the country level.
Consequently, only broad trends about the macroeconomic determinants of gross FDI flows can
be discerned.  Evaluations of the empirical studies based on the aggregate econometric approach
have been made by Agarwal (1980), Schneider and Frey (1985), and Hein (1992).
Although many aggregate econometric studies have been conducted (table  1), a broad
consensus on the major determinants of FDI has been elusive.  This lack of consensus can be
partly  attributed  to  the  lack  of  reliable  and  accurate  data  on  FDI  flows  and  its  potential
determinants,  particularly  at  the  sectoral  level,  and  the  fact  that  most  empirical  work  has
analyzed FDI determinants by pooling a group of countries that may be structurally diverse.  In
this paper structural differences refer to substantial discrepancies in  the basic macroeconomic
variables that characterize an economy (see the descriptive data contrasts between low-and high-
4FDI country groups detailed in table 3).  This investigation indicates that the empirical results
may differ significantly for country groups that are structurally different. 3
In addition to the traditional economic variables - such as GDP per capita, GDP growth,
and wage cost, antecedent factors that may encourage FDI flows include sociopolitical variables.
3.1  Sociopolitical  instability
Although "political risk" is frequently thought to influence decisions to invest in another country,
the  empirical  results  do  not  always  support  this  hypothesis.  Aharoni  (1966)  revealed  that
executives rank political instability as the most important variable, apart from market potential.
Conversely, Bennett and Green (1972) found that U.S. direct investments are not affected by
political instability in the recipient countries.  Levis (1979), employing two proxies for political
stability obtained mixed results.  He found "the absence of aggressive domestic behavior within
the political  system against groups or officeholders" to be a significant determinant of FDI for
the current period, but not for a lagged period. Another variable, the legitimacy of the regime,
was found to be significant for a lagged period but not significant for the current period.
Discriminant analysis of fifty eight developing  countries by Root  and Ahmed  (1979)
found that  "the number of regular (constitutional) changes in government leadership between
1956 and  1967" was significant.  However, other political  variables, such  as the number of
internal arned attacks, the degree of nationalism, and colonial affiliation, were not significant.
Schneider and Frey (1985) found a negative relationship between the "number of political
strikes and riots in host countries" and "the inflow of foreign direct investment."  Nigh (1985)
used  the  COBDAB  database,  which  constructs  aggregate  measures  of  intracountry  and
intercountry  conflict  and  cooperation.  He  found  that  for  developed  countries  intercountry
political  events were more significant determinants of FDI than intracountry events.  On the
other hand, for developing countries intracountry political events had a more robust relationship
with FDI.
More recently, Wheeler and Mody (1992) found a broad principal component measure of
administrative efficiency and political risk to be statistically insignificant.  Lucas (1993) does not
directly incorporate proxies for sociopolitical risk.  Rather, he finds episodic dummies for "good
events,"  such  as  the  Asian  and  Olympic  games  in  Korea,  and  Aquino's  accession  in  the
Philippines, to be positively related to FDI.  Conversely, "negative events,"  such as Sukarno's
rule in Indonesia, Park's assassination in Korea, and Marcos' martial law in the Philippines have a
negative effect on FDI.
31n the same vein, Wheeler and Mody (1992) indicates that elasticity estimates differ markedly for countries at different stages of
development.
5More than ten years ago, Stephen Kobrin (1981) observed:
"The term  oolitical risk' thus appears constrainedfrom  both an analytical
and operational viewpoint.  What we are, or should be, concerned with is
the impact of events which are political  in the sense that they arise from
power or authority relationships and which affect (or have the potential to
affect) the firm's  operation. Not the events, qua events, but their potential
manifestation as constraints upon foreign investors should be of concern."
(p. 71)
The empirical evidence on the impact of political risk is not unequivocal, partly because
it is difficult to  obtain reliable  quantitative estimates of this  qualitative phenomenon  for  an
extended period  of  time, particularly  aspects of political  risk,  which  are viewed as  a  direct
constraint by foreign investors.  Political instability is a complex phenomenon.  Most proxies that
are  available  capture only  some aspects of this  determinant.  Based  on this  discussion,  the
following empirical hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 1: What types  of sociopolitical instability negatively affect FDI  flows? Is
there a structural difference between countries with high or low FDI flows?
3.2  Business operating conditions
As Helleiner (1988) points  out, investment incentives created by the government, such as tax
holidays,  appear  to  play a  limited  role  in  intercountry investment decisions.  Most  of  the
empirical  literature  supports the notion that  specific incentives do  not have a  major  impact,
particularly  when  these  incentives  are  thought  to  compensate  for  other  comparative
disadvantages.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  generally  believed  that  removing  restrictions  and
providing good business operating conditions will positively affect FDI flows.
Within this context, there is a wide array of government policies that may increase or
decrease FDI flows (see the taxonomy provided in Brewer 1993 as an illustration).  It is difficult
to quantify these policies as a comprehensive explanatory variable.  An alternative, which this
paper adopts, is to rely on a qualitative index representing the judgments of experts in the field.
One aspect that has received considerable attention is the role of tariff barriers. Test of the
hypothesis that protective tariff barriers, by stimulating import-substituting FDI investments, will
encourage "tariff hopping" has received mixed results. However, most of the available evidence
supports  the  hypothesis,  particularly  the  analysis  of  U.S.  FDI  in  the  EC.  Given  these
considerations, the empirical hypothesis tested in this paper explores the following questions:
Hypothesis II: Does the overall perception of favorable business operating conditions
positively affect FDI flows? Do taxes on international trade result in "tariff hopping"?
63.3  Export orientation
An important controversy about FDI flows concerns the relative success of inward-and outward-
oriented determinants.  In addition to the size of the domestic market in the host country, open
export-oriented economies may be more successful in encouraging FDI flows. Recently, Hein
(1992) and Dollar (1992) have found that outward-oriented developing economies (that rely on
new export markets) have been relatively successful.  Lucas's (1993) investigation of Southeast
Asian countries provides some evidence of the relative importance of outward-oriented policies.
Specifically, FDI is relatively more elastic with respect to demand for exports than with respect
to  aggregate  domestic  demand.  If  outward-oriented  economies  are  relatively  successful  in
attracting more FDI, the size of the domestic market need not be a handicap.  Even small host
countries could influence global corporate decisions by encouraging export-oriented policies.
But,  the  empirical  literature  does  not  establish  whether  FDI  flows  are  attracted  by
economies  that  are  already  export-oriented  (exports  precede  FDI  flows)  or  whether  multi-
national investment causes exports to increase (FDI precedes exports).  From a policy point of
view, the direction of causality has obvious implications.  Based on these considerations,  the
questions to be explored under this hypothesis are:
Hypothesis III: What types of exports are related to FDI flows? What is the direction of
causality?
4.  Rationale  for Control Variables
Several variables  should be  included as controls to  test our three sets  of hypotheses.  They
include: market size, wage costs, the exchange rate, home country characteristics, debt equity
swaps and private restructuring, export orientation, interregional characteristics, and past FDI.
Market size.  The size of the market, typically proxied by the level of GNP, appears to be an
important  determinant of  FDI flows.  Bandera and  White  (1968) found market  size to  be  a
significant determinant of U.S. FDI.  Schmitz and Bieri (1972) found the one-period-lagged GNP
of the EEC to be a significant variable in a FDI demand function.  Lunn (1980) also found the
one-period-lagged  GNP  of the  EEC to  be  a  significant explanatory variable for  U.S.  direct
investment  in  Europe.  For  developing  countries,  Root  and  Ahmed  (1979),  Torrisi  (1985),
Schneider and Frey (1985), Petrochilas (1989), and Wheeler and Mody (1992) all find market
size to be significant.
But,  the  United  Nations  Centre  on  Transnational  Corporations  (1992)  survey  cites
conflicting evidence for the growth rate of GNP, once market size is included.  For example,
Lunn (1980) found the growth rate of output to  be statistically significant.  But  although the
growth rate lagged in the second period was significant, it had the wrong sign.  Because the
importance of market size is fairly well established, it is not the focus of this paper.  Since our
dependent variable is FDI relative to GDP, the relationship with other GDP-related variables on
7the right hand side of the equation may not be unequivocal.  We include both per  capita GDP
(GDPCAP) and the growth rate of GDP (GDP%) to control for actual and potential market size.
Wage  costs.  The  standard hypothesis  holds  that  lower  relative wage  costs  will encourage
"efficiency-seeking" FDI flows.  But results do not offer a clear guide.  The extensive empirical
investigations of the relative wage  costs in Canada and the United States indicate that wage
differentials  are  not  a  significant  determinant  for  industrial  countries.  Owen  (1982),  while
analyzing the interindustry determinants of foreign direct investment in Canadian manufacturing
industries, found labor cost differentials between Canada and the United States to be  statistically
insignificant.  Gupta (1983) found that wages of production workers in Canada (relative to those
in the United States) were not a significant determinant in a comprehensive model.  This result
held for both ordinary  least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares regressions.
However, recent results for developing countries seem to indicate that relative wage costs
are a significant determinant of FDI flows.  Flamm (1984), Schneider and Frey (1985), Lucas
(1993), and Wheeler and Mody (1992) all find a wage cost variable to be significant. We include
a real earnings index as a control for real wages (EARN).
Exchange rate.  Lucas (1993) contends that the exchange rate may have "a residual role with
respect to exchange rate risk, for example, in determining the value of repatriated profits or in
threatening restrictions on such remittances" (p. 393).  In order to control for this possibility, the
real exchange rate is included as a control variable (XRATE).
Home country factors.  Culem (1988) analyzed the bilateral flows of direct investment for six
industrial countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
United States,).  He found that the home country characteristics of the investing firm (such as
growth rates and labor costs) did not improve the performance of the model.  Because we are
analyzing global FDI flows to developing countries, the opportunity costs of investing abroad for
the specific host country are not directly discernible.  One would expect a general increase in
opportunity  costs  to  influence the  size of  FDI  flows  to  developing  countries,  but  not  the
allocation to  specific countries.  Consequently, in  order to  control for aggregate supply side
effects, we include the average industrial production index of the G-7 countries (computed from
the IMF's International Financial Statistics 1993) as a control variable (IPG7).
Debt  equity  swaps  and  private  restructuring.  Since  the  late  1980s several  developing
countries with large debt burdens have implemented debt conversion programs. 4 Countries with
substantial  conversion  programs  include  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico,  the
Philippines  and Venezuela.  Components of the debt conversion programs that relate to debt
equity swaps and restructuring of institutions are likely to be correlated with FDI flows because
these procedures were employed not only to reduce the debt burden but also to encourage foreign
investment.  The debt equity swaps and private sector restructuring, performed by commercial
4See  Appendix 6 of World Debt Tables 1994-95 for a brief update of debt conversion programs.
8banks,  relative  to  the  total  long-term  debt  is  employed  to  control  for  this  phenomenon
(DSWAP).s
Export orientation.  There are two reasons for including exports as a control variable.  First,
there is a widespread perception that "open" economies encourage more confidence and foreign
investment.  One indicator of openness is the relative size of the export sector.  Second, exports
should be included as a control variable because of the higher export propensity of foreign firms
(Chen, 1994). This issue has generated considerable controversy. For example, Westphal (1979)
contended that exports may be correlated with FDI, not because the foreign firms have a greater
export orientation but, because they are disproportionately represented in the main export sectors.
However,  as  Chen  (1994)  correctly points  out,  this  distinction does  not  negate  the  overall
contribution of foreign firms to the export sector.
Note  that  if export  orientation is  a  signal and a  magnet  for attracting  foreign  firms,
exports would Granger cause FDI, whereas if the entry of foreign firms result in greater export
orientation, FDI would Granger cause exports.  (We explore the direction of causality in Section
6.)  Exports relative to GDP are included as a control variable (EXPORTS).
Interregional  differences.  Because we are  using a  pooled model,  the  analysis focuses  on
attempting to explain variations of FDI flows over time and across countries.  The timeseries
portion of the data captures intracountry variation.  In addition  to country-specific economic
variables  that  vary over  time,  a time  dummy is employed  to  control for other  time-related
factors.
Intercountry variation presents a methodological dilemma.  The interesting cross-country
variations  (which  we  are  attempting  to  explain  with  qualitative variables),  generally  occur
slowly, although the differences may be substantial.  Country-specific dummy variables are not
included because they will remove this variation, leaving mostly within country variation.  But,
we  need  to  establish  some  form  of  control  that  will  not  eliminate  most  of  the  interesting
intercountry variation. To do this we employ four dummy variables to control for region-specific
factors.6  Regional  differences  may  exist because  FDI  flows  are known  to  follow  certain
discernible characteristics (e.g., "triad pattern").  The regional dummies may also capture some
economies of agglomeration.
Lagged dependent variable.  FDI flows are likely to require time to  adjust to desired levels,
depending  on the specific constraints faced by a  transnational corporation.  A  simple partial
sWe are grateful to David Hedley of The Institute of International Finance for providing the data on the different components of
the debt conversion programs performed by commercial banks.
6Wheeler  and Mody (1992) have developed a similar rationale for excluding country-specific dummies.  Incorporating regional
dummies is a traditional procedure for handling this dilemma  For example, Barro  (1991) estimates a pooled model with regional
dummies to analyze the determinants of economic growth.
9adjustment process can incorporate the speed of adjustment (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld  1991:
208-9).
We begin  with a simple equation:
FDIdt=B.+BIPIt+B2CV1  (1)
Desired  FDI stock at time t (FDId  )  is based on political  instability (PI) at time  (t), a
vector  of  control  variables  (CV,),  and  a  random  error  term E,.  To  see  how the  speed  of
adjustment is incorporated in this model, consider the following equation:
FDlt - FDlt.l = A(FDIdt  - FDltl)  (2)
Equation 2 shows that changes in actual FDI will respond only partially to the difference
between desired FDI and past values of FDI.  In any given period a desired level of FDI may not
be  completely realized (as actual FDI in the next period) because of physical and procedural
constraints.  The parameter A captures the speed of adjustment to a desired FDI level.
When we substitute FDI  from  equation I into  equation 2 and rearrange, we obtain:
FDIt = AB.  + B A(PId + B2A(CVd  + (  -A)FDIt,  + AEt  (3)
In addition to the rationale given in a simple stock adjustment model for using the lagged
dependent variable as an explanatory variable, two other purposes arise.  First, it takes care of
any residual autocorrelation that may exist.  Second, the lagged dependent variable indirectly
incorporates other "omitted" factors that may have negatively influenced FDI in the previous
period. Thus the lagged dependent variable is employed as a control variable (RFDI1).
Based on the rationale discussed in this section, the fully specified model (Model 4 in the
tables) can be represented as:
RFDI= DI(DASIA) + D2(DLA) +D3(DAFRICA) + D4(DEUROPE)
+ BI(PRI) + B2(IPG7) + B3(GDPCAP) + B4(GDPGROW)
- B5(EARN) + B6(DSWAP) - B7(XRATE) + BA(EXPORTS)
+ Bg(RFDI  1) + Et.  (4)
DASIA, DLA, DAFRICA  and DEUROPE  are the intercept dummies  for Asia,  Latin
America, Africa,  and Europe respectively.
105.  Descrilptive  Data
The empirical results are based on a pooled model.  The analysis covers  1970-93 for thirty one
countries. 7 Countries were chosen based on  the availability of consistent data.  Note that for
each hypothesis, the years and the countries vary depending on the availability of data. 8
5.1  Dependent variable
A relative measure of FDI is employed to control for any large country effects.  The dependent
variable  (henceforth referred to as RFDI)  is FDI flows in constant dollars relative to real GDP.
RFDI is  a "net" investment variable in that it excludes repatriated profits.  The fact that some
developing countries have become exporters of capital may distort the empirical testing. (table
2).  Consequently, outward bound FDI is not subtracted out.
5.2  Rationale for subsample analysis
One problem with a pooled model is that countries that are structurally different may be forced to
exhibit identical coefficients. In this paper we identify countries with low or high-FDI flows over
the entire twenty four-year sample period.  The rationale for employing the size of FDI flows for
subsample  analysis  is  to  examine  differences  between  successful  countries  (those  that
consistently attract high flows) and unsuccessful countries (those with low average FDI flows).
Once  the countries  are ranked according to  average  FDI flows, where  should the  combined
sample be  split?  Brown and others (1975) suggested a  Quandt Log-Likelihood Ratio test to
objectively  determine where the split should be made. 9 Based on this criterion, a grid-search
across  the  country  subsamples  was  conducted  to  find  an  objective  point  to  subdivide  the
combined  sample.  For Brazil the grid search indicated that the log ratio reaches a minimum
(combined log ratio of -316.81) at an average RFDI value of 94 percent.'0 The country ranked
above Brazil is Colombia, with  1.07 percent.  Consequently, countries with an average RFDI of
less than 1 percent per year are classified as "low FDI countries": India (.05 percent), Venezuela
(.10 percent),  Bolivia  (.20 percent), Peru (.27 percent), Korea (.32 percent), Madagascar  (.33
percent), Pakistan (.34 percent), Turkey (.38 percent), Chile (.50 percent), the Philippines  (.57
percent), Kenya (.61 percent), Panama (.65 percent), Ghana (.66 percent), Uruguay (.76 percent),
Argentina (.77 percent), Indonesia (.87 percent), and Brazil (.94 percent).
7The  empirical test  includes two countries --  Singapore and Spain -- that are not presently classified as developing
countries.  But, they are included because of the long sample period for which  (at least in part) they were developing economies
and the fact that some previous studies on FDI in developing countries included them.
sDetails of the countries included for each hypothesis are provided in the notes to the relevant tables.
9The  maximum change in the structure of the two subsamples occurs at the point where the sum of the log-likelihood ratios of the
subsamples reaches a minimum.
'° The grid search specification employs PRI, RFDII, TIME, GDPCAP, GDPGROW, and DESWAP as explanatory variables.
I1Similarly, countries with an average RFDI of more than 1 percent are classified as "high-
FDI countries": Colombia (1.07 percent), Thailand (1.17 percent),  Greece (1.23 percent), Spain
(1.25 percent), China (1.29 percent), Mexico (1.49 percent), Portugal (1.50 percent), Egypt (1.76
percent),  Ecuador (1.83 percent), Nigeria (2.15 percent),  Costa Rica (2.48 percent),  Malaysia
(4.17 percent), Botswana (4.54 percent), and Singapore (9.93 percent).
A few countries that are classified as low-FDI countries have attracted high  flows in
recent years, including  Argentina, Chile, and Indonesia (table 2). A country's performance over
the  entire  sample  range  for  the regression  analysis  is  the relevant variable.  In  general,  the
countries classified as recipients of high flows have maintained a consistent performance.
5.3  Descriptive statistics
Low FDI countries have an average RFDI of .50 percent whereas the high-FDI countries have an
average of 2.37 percent (table 3).  As expected, countries that received high-FDI flows have per
capita income that is almost twice that of low-FDI countries.  More revealing is the fact that
these high-FDI countries show a stronger correlation between per capita income and RFDI (.45
compared with .05 for low-FDI countries).II  The same pattern holds for annual GDP growth
rates:  high-FDI countries have higher growth rates and these growth rates are more strongly
correlated with  RFDI (.21 compared with  .10).  Although the average  real earnings index is
almost the same for both  groups, real earnings have a higher positive correlation in high-FDI
countries (.31 compared with .06).  Also expected,  high-FDI countries have a larger proportion
of exports as a share of GDP (35.00 percent compared with 20.19 percent).  More important for
this investigation, the correlation coefficient between exports and RFDI is much higher for high-
FDI  countries  (.82) than to  for low-FDI  countries (.11).  In fact,  exports are more  strongly
correlated with RFDI than any other explanatory variable.12 This strong relationship dominates
the  controlled  econometric  analysis that  follows.  Table  3  also  shows  that  this  important
difference between high-and low-FDI countries is driven by manufacturing exports rather than
primary product exports.  Manufacturing exports have a much higher correlation with FDI flows
in high-FDI countries compared with low-FDI countries (.80 compared with .01).  For low-FDI
countries, primary product exports have a higher share (9.26 percent of GDP) than manufacturing
exports (4.00 percent of GDP).  This implies that  a substantial amount of FDI flowing into the
low-FDI group may be extractive. 13
" Simple correlation coefficients  should be viewed with caution and are not a good substitute for controlled analysis. But, they do
bring out some salient features of the data set.
12This is also evident in the combined sample results presented in the correlation matrix in table 4. For the combined sample, the
Pearson correlation for RFDI and EXPORTS is .86. The second highest correlation comes from the political risk variables:
for ORI and PRI the corresponding numbers are .60 and .58, respectively.
13Disaggregate  studies at the sectoral level must be performed to pin down the precise differences in manufacturing and primary
product exports in low-and high-FDI countries.
12Not  surprisingly, the  share of long-tern  debt that has  been converted by  debt equity
swaps and  restructuring  (DSWAP) is more positively correlated with  FDI flows in  low-FDI
countries (.18 compared with .01).  The remaining variables relating to the three hypotheses are
discussed in detail in the next section.
6.  Empirical  Results
Based  on  Leamer's  (1985)  approach,  a  range  of  specifications  are  estimated  to  assess  the
sensitivity  of the  coefficients of  the hypothesized  variables.  The hypothesis  testing  can be
represented by a simple equation:
RFDI= F (HV, ClJ  (5)
In addition to specifying the proxy for the hypothesized variable (HV), it is important to
specify the vector of control variables (CV) to correctly estimate the equation. We have taken
previous  empirical  work as a guide to the variables that  should be  included (see  section 4).
Additional control variables are progressively added to the model to determine how robust the
results are to alternative specifications.  The inclusion of additional variables can also reveal the
extent of multicollinearity in the estimating equation.  All models are estimated with ordinary
least  squares.'4 Because  higher-income  countries  may  attract  more  absolute  flows,  all
independent variables are represented in real and relative terms (table 4). All estimated results are
provided in Appendix I.
6.1  Sociopolitical instability
We test the first hypothesis by employing two proxies to capture different aspects of political
instability.  Specific  questions  to  be  examined are:  What  types  of  sociopolitical instability
negatively affect FDI flows?  Is there a structural difference between countries with high or low
FDI flows?
Political risk index (PRI).  First, we employ a political risk index (PRI) developed by Business
Environment Risk Intelligence, S.A. (BERI).  About sixty political specialists from around the
world  evaluate  each  country  with  respect  to  six  internal  causes  of  political  risk  -
fractionalization of the political spectrum; linguistic, ethnic, and religious fractionalization;  and
coercive  political  risk  (dependence  on  and/or  importance  to  a  hostile  power)  -and  two
symptoms of political risk (societal conflict involving demonstrations and street violence).
]4 The economic  structure  of the sample  countries  is likely  to be dynamic. Given our ignorance  about the specification  of this
structure,  a  simultaneous  equations model (which is more sensitive  to specification  errors) is considered  less desirable. A
simultaneous  bias  test is  performed  for each  hypothesized  variable.
13The  qualitative  index  generated  ranges  from  0  (prohibitive  risk)  to  100  (complete
stability).  The values determined  by the political  specialists are averaged  for  each  country
annually.  The average political risk index for high-FDI countries is 49.12, compared with 43.54
for low-FDI countries (see table 3).  More importantly, the correlation coefficient between PRI
and RFDI is more than four times higher in high-FDI countries (.61 compared with .15).
In order to  analyze the influence of  PRI on  FDI  flows, a  range of specifications  are
employed to test the robustness of the results.  As additional control variables are included, the
size of the sample changes based on the availability of data.'5 The data set suffers from missing
observations.  As a general rule, if data are not available for a specific variable and time period,
the observation is excluded from the regression estimation.  16  The stability of the coefficient of
the hypothesized variable can be assessed as the control variables and the sample size change for
different specifications.  All results are reported after conducting White's (1980) correction for
heteroscedasticity.
Another issue that should be addressed is the problem of autocorrelation.  The inclusion
of  the  lagged dependent  variable  reduces autocorrelation considerably.  Because  we have  a
lagged dependent  variable on the right hand  side, the Durbin-Watson statistic is not  strictly
applicable, although it does give some  indication of the extent  of autocorrelation.  For each
hypothesis, if the alternative Durbin statistic17  for Model 3 indicates potential autocorrelation, the
results are reported after correction (see the footnotes of the tables for specific  details). The
results for each specification are discussed below (table 5).
*  Model  1: Initially, RFDI is regressed with PRI, GDP%, GDP per capita, a time dummy (to
capture  other time-related effects), and  lagged FDI  (RFDI1).  PRI  is significant at the  1
percent level (with a t-value of 2.67).  The time dummy, GDP per capita, and RFDI 1 are also
significant.  The  high  t-value  of  RFDI1  (13.88)  and  the  low  value  of  the  adjustment
coefficient (A ranging from .11 to  .26 in table 5) indicates that the stock adjustment model
should be used.
*  Model  2: In this specification, real eamings (EARN) and debt equity swaps (DSWAP) are
included  in  as  control  variables.  As  expected,  the  eaming  coefficient  is  negative  and
15 Another reason for reporting a large number of regressions with different control variables is because of the trade off between
the amount of control variables and the availability of data.  When less control variables are employed, the available data set is more
extensive. As we increase the set of control variables,  data availability constraints reduce the number of observations.
16 As Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991:. 219-20) point out, if the missing observations dropped are random, the least squares estimator
is still unbiased, although there is some loss of efficiency. Because the sample size is fairly large (ranging from ninety seven for the
subsample analysis to 443 for some aggregate  models), the loss in efficiency is not likely to be an issue.
17 The Durbin alternative test involves regressing the error term of the primary equation with all the explanatory variables and the
lagged error term. A significant t-value for the lagged error term indicates the presence of autocorrelation.  This test is reported for
Model 3 in the relevant tables.  The WDL proxy for the combined model had significant autocorrelation. Consequently, the results
in table 7 are reported after correction.
14significant. The coefficient for DSWAP is statistically insignificant.  PRI is significant at the
I percent level.
*  Model 3: In this specification we include the exchange rate (XRATE), the average industrial
production of G-7 countries (IPG7), and the regional dummy variables.  IPG7 is generally
increasing over time  (as manifested by a high correlation of  .97 with the time  dummy). 8
Consequently, the significance pattern for IPG7 is similar to that of the time dummy: positive
and significant.  The exchange rate has the expected negative sign and is significant at the 1
percent level.  The regional dummy variables are uniformly negative and significant.  PRI
continues to be significant at the 1 percent level.
*  Model 4: The inclusion of exports relative to GDP in the estimated equation considerably
weakens  the  significance  of  the  PRI  coefficient  (with  a  t-value  of  1.40).  Given  that
EXPORTS  has  the  strongest  correlation  with  RFDI  (see  table  4),  this  result  is  not
surprsing.1 9
*  Model 5:  Pindyck and Rubenfeld (1991, pp. 303-4) have suggested a modified Hausman
specification test to assess the simultaneity bias that may be present in the  OLS estimates.
The  two-step  procedure  involves  first estimating  an  auxiliary  equation  in  which  PRI  is
regressed against exogenous or predetermined variables (in our case lagged PRI and a time
trend).  In the second step the residuals of this auxiliary equation are included in the original
equation  as an additional explanatory variable.  This  test is performed on Model  3.  The
results indicate that the bias is statistically significant at the 10 percent level (with a t-value
of 1.78). However, the PRI coefficient continues to be significant at the 1 percent level.
In the next stage of the analysis models are estimated separately for low-and high-FDI
countries (table 6).20 The model is estimated for the two critical specifications (Models 2 and
3).21  In general, the models of the low-FDI countries have a relatively poor fit.  The comparative
results indicate that PRI is statistically significant for high-FDI countries at the 1 percent level
for both models and only at the 10 percent level for the low-FDI group.  Moreover, the size of
the PRI coefficient  is relatively  much higher in  the high-FDI countries (by approximately  a
magnitude of four or five).  Thus where the stakes are higher (in high-FDI countries), PRI is
significantly related to FDI flows.
is Because of the high correlation, only one of these variables is included in each regression.
19 There is also a high correlation (0.72) between PRI and EXPORTS, indicating that multicollinearity could be driving down the
t-value for PRI.
20 An F-test score of 4.95 at the 1 percent level indicates  that the model should be estimated separately.
21 We have already established in model 4 that the inclusion of EXPORTS  erode the significance of PRI.
15Note that the primary focus is on the coefficients of the hypothesized variable, that is to
observe whether they are robust as different controls are implemented.  The coefficients of the
control variables are not subjected to any systematic analysis and thus should be interpreted with
caution.  Some general comments about the coefficients of the control variables across various
specifications  should  be  made.  The  real  earnings  variable  (EARN)  is  generally  negative,
although it is significant in only some specifications of the combined model.  The exchange rate
variable is generally negative and  sometimes significant.  Exports and  IPG7 are  uniformally
positive and significant. DSWAP is generally positive and sometimes significant.  GDPCAP and
GDP% are generally positive and sometimes significant in the combined sample and the high-
FDI subsamples.  For the low-FDI group, the GDPCAP and GDP% coefficients have mixed
signs and are generally  insignificant. 22
Work days lost (WDL).  Kobrin (1981) pointed out that elements of political risk that have a
"potential manifestation as constraints upon foreign investors" may be more directly relevant.
The annual reports of the International Labor Organization provide aggregate country data about
the number of "work days lost" because of industrial or civil strife.  This proxy for sociopolitical
instability  may  be  more  directly  relevant  for  FDI-flows  because  of  the  potential  costs  of
disrupted production.  Table 2 indicates that low-FDI countries have a relatively higher number
of work days lost (4.3 percent compared with 2.2 percent).
In order to evaluate the effect of this variable on FDI, the same specifications employed
for  PRI are repeated for work days  lost (WDL). 23 A number of  patterns emerge  from this
analysis (table 7).  WDL is significant at the 10 percent level for Model 3 and Model  5.  But
when exports  are included as an explanatory variable in Model 4, WDL becomes statistically
insignificant (multicollinearity may be one reason; the correlation between WDL and exports is -
.31).  The Hausman test for simultaneous equation bias (Model 5) indicates that the relationship
between  RFDI  and  WDL  is  strengthened  marginally  once  the  test  is  implemented  (using
predetermined WDLtI and a time trend as explanatory variables in the auxiliary equation).
In  contrast  to  PRI,  the  overall  qualitative  measure  of  political  risk  in  which  the
regressions  are estimated separately for high-and low-FDI countries, the relationship between
WDL and RFDI is more significant in the low-FDI countries (table 8).  For low-FDI countries
WDL  is significant at the  1 percent  level in Model 2 and  the 10 percent level  in Model 3.
Although  PRI, indirectly incorporates  WDL, if both  variables  are included in  Model  3, a t-
statistic of 2.32  is obtained for PRI and -.56 for WDL. 24 The two coefficients jointly have an F-
value of 5.27, which rejects the null hypothesis of zero coefficients for both variables at the I
percent level.
22  This uneven and contrary result for the low-FDI countries is not surprising, given the low correlation between RFDI and
GDPCAP (0.05) and RFDI and GDPGROW (0.10).
23For  the WDL proxy, the Durbin alternative test indicates the presence of first order autocorrelation at the 5 percent level.
Consequently, all results in table 3 are reported after correcting for the first-order serial correlation.
24 The Pearson correlation between PRI and WDL is -.24.
16Two caveats about WDL must be i'mentiofed. Almost every country has some missing
observations, which reduces the sample size (see ILO anrnual  reports for details).  The data may
have a  self-selection  bias  in that  some  countries may not  report data  when there  are  major
interruptions in the production process.  But this bias, if it exists, will make it more difficult to
reject the  null hypothesis  (no relationship).  The results  should be  interpreted  with  caution,
particularly in view of the missing observations.
Another  variable analyzed  as a  proxy  for sociopolitical  instability  (a  political  rights
index) gave uneven results, possibly because of the narrow range of the index. 25 The relationship
was initially positive, but as additional control variables were included it became negative.  The
significance pattern was not robust in the subsamples of high-and low-FDI countries.
6.2  Business Operating Conditions
Although,  as  Helleiner  (1988)  indicates,  specific  investment  incentives  established  by  the
government appear to play a limited role in intercountry investment decisions, there is a general
belief that  conducive business operating conditions are necessary for attracting FDI.  In order to
evaluate  this  contention  (Hypothesis II),  we  analyze two  proxies  for  a  hospitable  business
environment.
Operation  risk  index (ORI).  An interesting index developed by BERI is the operation risk
index (ORI) which assesses the general business climate.  A panel of 105 experts from around
the world evaluate each country on the basis of two criteria:  the extent to which nationals are
given preferential treatment and the general quality of the business climate.  A wide range of
factors are evaluated, including political continuity, attitude toward foreign investors, balance of
payments performance, economic growth, enforceability of contracts,  currency convertibility,
and infrastructure and local  management. This qualitative index ranges  from 0 (unacceptable
business conditions) to 100 (superior operating conditions).
Table 3 indicates that, as expected, ORI is relatively higher in the high-FDI countries
(50.5 compared with 43.6).  What is remarkable is the low correlation between RFDI and ORI in
low-FDI countries (.05) and the high, positive correlation in the high-FDI countries (.67).
The  empirical  analysis  of  ORI  indicates  that  it  is  statistically  significant  in  all  the
specifications in the combined model (table 9).  Note that GDP% is not employed as a control
variable  because it is part of the index evaluation criteria.  The subgroup analysis shows that the
relationship  between  RFDI and  ORI is  less robust for  low-FDI countries than  for  high-FDI
countries  (table  10).  The  size  of  the  coefficients  of  ORI  for  the  high-FDI  group  are
25 The political rights index, originally developed by Gastil and published by Freedom House (various issues of "Freedom in the
World"), ranges from 7 (not free) to I (completely free).
17approximately twice that of the corresponding coefficients of the low-FDI group, implying that
business operating conditions are more important for attracting FDI flows in the high-FDI group.
Taxes on international trade and transactions (ITAX).  Government Finance Statistics (GFS),
published annually by the IMF, reports the amount of revenues accruing to governments as taxes
on international trade and transactions (table A, item 6).  These tax revenues, obtained primarily
from import and customs duties, are normalized by the total tax revenue to obtain the relative tax
burden borne by the international sector (ITAX).
From Table 3 we can see that the relative tax revenues from the trade sector are only
marginally lower in the high-FDI countries (16.5 percent compared with 17.1 percent).  In both
high-and  low-FDI  countries  the  simple  correlation  between  RFDI  and  ITAX  is  small  and
negative.  Thus, it is not  surprising that when ITAX is regressed  against RFDI  without any
controls, the relationship is negative and insignificant (table 1  1).
But, in Model 2, once controls are introduced for market size (GDPCAP and GDP%), the
relationship between ITAX and RFDI  becomes positive  and significant.  Because higher tax
revenues from the trade sector may simply reflect higher turnover, exports relative to  GDP is
employed  as  a  control  variable  in  all  specifications  (EXPORTS).  ITAX  continues  to  be
significant in alternative specifications of Model 3 and Model 4.  The simultaneous bias  test
erodes the significance of the relationship to the 10 percent level (ITAX has a t - value of 1.81 in
Model 5).  This result indicates "tariff hopping" behavior in FDI flows to avoid trade-related
taxes and take advantage of the host market.
The  separate  regressions run  for  low-and  high-FDI  groups indicate  that  the  positive
relationship between ITAX and RFDI in the combined sample is driven by the high-FDI group
(table 12).  For the low-FDI countries, the relationship between ITAX and RFDI is negative and
insignificant.  In contrast, for high-FDI countries the relationship is positive and significant for
both Model 3 and Model 4, indicating that "tariff hopping" is prevalent in this group. 6
One caveat about the ITAX proxy should be made: government finance statistics are only
as good as the quality of the data provided by the respective agencies.  As a result, there may be
considerable variation in the accuracy of the revenue estimates across countries.
6.3  Export Orientation and FDI
When exports are employed as a control variable in the combined regressions (Model 4), it is
consistently  a significant determinant of RFDI (see tables  5,7, and 9).  In  fact, one  statistical
regularity that is robust in all the models (discussed above)  is that export orientation is the single
26 The per capita GDP of the high-FDI group is almost twice that of the low-FDI group (see table 3).  In fact, if our entire sample is
sorted by per capita GDP (high-and low-income groups) rather than by average FDI flows (high-and low-FDI groups), the results for
the two groups correspond closely.
18most  important  determinant  of  FDI  flows.  In  this  section  we  analyze this  crucial  linkage,
determining  the type of exports that are  related  to  FDI flows, and the direction of causality
(Hypothesis Ill).
FDI  and  sectoral  exports.  The first two  regressions indicate that  exports  in  the high-FDI
countries are a significant determinant of FDI, whereas in low-FDI countries exports do not play
a significant role (table 13).  When the model is estimated for manufacturing exports (MFEXP),
the results are similar.
In the high-FDI group the coefficient on MFEXP is almost twice that  of EXPORTS,
indicating that in the high-FDI group the manufacturing component of exports is a driving force
compared with overall exports.  This notion is corroborated by the results for the primary product
exports.  In the primary export sector the relationship between PPEXP and RFDI is statistically
insignificant in both  the high-and low-FDI countries.  Exports in general,  and manufacturing
exports in particular, are a significant determinant in high-FDI countries.
Exports and FDI: causality results.  The previous analysis indicates that exports (particularly
manufacturing exports) are a significant determinant of FDI flows in high-FDI countries.  But the
question remains as to whether export-oriented economies attracted FDI (exports preceded FDI)
or  foreign  investment  encouraged  higher  exports  (FDI  preceded  exports).  To  answer  this
question, we perform Granger causality tests for each country in the high-FDI group.  As Leamer
(1985) points out, Granger causality does not imply "causality" as  defined in a layman's terms,
but rather "precedence" in a lead-lag relationship.
"Augmented" Granger causality tests were conducted - in addition to past values of the
dependent variable, past values of GDP per capita, GDP growth, and IPG7 were included before
the additional explanatory power of the hypothesized variable was tested.  The results should be
interpreted  with  caution  because the estimates are likely to  suffer from  a  small-sample bias
(annual observations for each country range from twenty to twenty three years).  For the country-
specific  tests,  three  annual  lags  are employed in  order  to  conserve degrees  of freedom, the
purpose here is to observe the general direction of the results rather than rely on any single result.
The results indicate that for some countries (Thailand: 1 percent significance; Ecuador
and Portugal 5 percent significance; and Greece and Singapore, 10 percent significance) exports
Granger  cause  FDI  (table  14).  The only  country in  which  FDI  Granger causes  exports  is
Singapore  (10  percent  significance  level),  suggesting  a  b-directional  causality.  For  other
countries the  results are insignificant.27  A combined  test for the five countries that  showed
significant feedback from exports to FDI indicates relatively stronger feedback from exports to
FDI.
27Singapore  receives the most FDI, relatively for any country in our sarnple.  Consequently, it is conceivable that the feedback
from FDI to exports is not statistically significant for other countries because FDI is not large enough to influence overall exports.
Results for specific sectoral exports may be different.
19The five countries that had significant feedback from exports to FDI also show significant
feedback from manufacturing exports to FDI.  Again for Singapore, there is feedback from FDI
to  manufacturing exports.  Although the dynamic relationship between FDI and EXPORTS is
likely to be simultaneous, the results support the general notion that exports induce FDI.
7.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
Without placing too much weight on a single regression, the following patterns emerge from our
analysis:
*  Because  sociopolitical  instability  is  a  complex  phenomenon,  regression  results  differ
substantially  when  different  proxies  are  employed  to  capture  the  relationship.  The
significance  of a broad-based qualitative political risk  index is greater  for the high-FDI
group.
*  Work days lost in production, a variable that is more directly and immediately relevant for
production efficiency, is more significant for low-FDI countries.
*  Once the relative size of exports is introduced as a control variable, the influence of these
proxies  of political instability on FDI flows erode substantially.  This  change may not be
surprising, given that EXPORTS has the strongest correlation with FDI flows, particularly in
high-FDI countries.  On balance, the export orientation of the country seems to matter most.
*  A qualitative index for general business conditions is a  significant factor for  FDI  flows
particularly in  the high-FDI group.
*  Among the high-FDI countries, there is evidence of "tariff hopping," as tax revenues from
international trade and transactions are positively related to FDI flows once market size and
other economic variables are taken into consideration.
*  Exports, particularly manufacturing exports, are a significant determinant of FDI flows for
high-FDI countries,  but not for low-FDI countries.
*  Causality tests indicate that although the dynamic relationship between exports and FDI is
likely to be simultaneous to some extent, there is stronger feedback from exports to FDI.
The results provide insight on another important issue: countries that have historically
high-or low-FDI flows are structurally different (in terms of the characteristics discussed in table
3), and the tested hypotheses differ when the two groups are analyzed separately.  This finding
may partly explain why tests on the determinants of FDI have been mixed and inconclusive in
past aggregate  studies.  Since the results  may be  sensitive to  the way the different  structural
20groups are defined and the thresholds set for demarcating groups, more intensive research on the
differences  in  the  structure  of  country  groups  relative  to  the  testing  of  macroeconomic
hypotheses would be warranted.
Fry  (1993),  while  analyzing  the  impact of  FDI  flows,  found  a  structural  difference
between country groups.  For a control group of eleven developing countries, FDI is associated
with  reduced domestic  investment.  But,  in  six Pacific  Basin  market  economies, FDI  raises
domestic  investment  by  the  full extent  of  the  flow.  Viewed  in  this  context,  it  should  be
understandable that the determinants of FDI flows are different for high-and low-FDI countries.
Several policy implications flow from these results. First,  for  countries  with  relatively
low-FDI flows, sociopolitical instability manifested in work hours lost is a significant deterrent
to FDI flows.  Given that FDI operations in the low-FDI group are likely to be labor intensive, a
higher premium appears to be placed on labor relations.  A priority for these countries should
be to stabilize labor relations and the working environment to attract FDI inflows.  For countries
that receive relatively high-FDI flows, perceptions of overall political stability have a significant
influence on FDI flows. In the high-FDI group direct investment is likely to be capital intensive,
requiring  a  relatively  more substantive  and  long-term commitment.29  Consequently,  overall
perceptions of political stability play a significant role in sustaining high level of FDI flows.
Second, a similar rationale can be applied for favorable business operating conditions.
Operation risk index seems to be a more significant determinant in the high-FDI group.  This
finding is consistent with the general notion that some developing countries are not  seriously
considered  by  transnational  firms  until  they  have  achieved a  reasonable  level  of  corporate
hospitality.  A higher relative burden of revenues raised from international trade does not appear
to be detrimental to FDI flows for the high-FDI countries.  But this does not mean that taxing
international trade is an advisable policy option, as other costs, such as efficiency distortions and
the opportunity costs of higher foregone trade, are likely to arise.
Third, the results support the notion that export orientation is a significant determinant of
FDI flows for high-FDI countries.  In fact, the relative size of the export sector is the strongest
explanatory variable for FDI flows.  In particular, manufacturing exports play a critical role.
This inference is strengthened by causality tests, which indicate that exports precede FDI flows.
The sample data do not indicate a relatively high feedback from FDI to exports.  On balance,
because exports are the strongest explanatory variable for FDI flows and there is little evidence
on feedback from FDI to exports, even fairly-well established developing countries should seek
alternative  ways  to  develop  a  vibrant  export  sector  under  a  liberalized trade  regime  as  a
pragmatic way to encourage consistent FDI flows.
28 This issue must be investigated more extensively by analyzing FDI flows of specific industries having different capital-labor
intensities,  with labor relations variables.
29 Again, only sectoral FDI data analysis can pin down the relationship between capital intensive FDI and perceptions of overall
political stability.
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Table 1: Summary of Five Aggregate Studies
Author\year;  Sample years;  Significant  General
dependent  number of  variables  comments
variable  countries
Root and Ahmed  58 developing  Per capita GDP, GDP growth rate,  Employed  discriminant  analysis
(1977);  countries;  economic integration,  urbanization.
Average  per capita FDI  1966-70
Nigh (1984);  24 countries;  Indicators of  international conflict  Did not control for other
U.S. manufacturing  1954-1975  and  cooperation, internal conflict,  economic  factors; political  data
investment  GDP change  detailed and comprehensive
Schneider and Frey  54 developing  Real per capita GNP, inflation,  Incorporated  both economic
(1985);  countries;  Balance of  Payment  deficit, wage  and political variables
Net per capita FDI  1976, 1979,  cost, credit rating, political
1980  instability.
Wheeler and Mody  42 countries;  Labor  cost, market size,  level  of  Employed  qualitative  data;
(1992);  1982-88  FDI, infrastructure  tested for stability of results
Capital exports.
of U.S. companies
Lucas (1993); Real net  7 Southeast  Real wages, industrial  disputes  Model based on production
FDI  Asian  function with few controls.
countries;
1961-87
22Table 2: Sample Countries and Real Net FDI Flows (RFDI) - Percentage of GDP
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993
Argentina  1.61  1.97  3.06  5.25
Bolivia  .51  .93  1.57  2.89
Botswana  1.57  1.70  2.13  2.30
Brazil  .27  .29  .44  .28
Chile  .87  1.85  2.17  2.76
China  .84  .98  2.19  6.23
Costa Rica  2.79  2.99  3.39  4.88
Colombia  1.08  .97  1.59  1.95
Ecuador  .60  .59  .56  .89
Egypt  1.65  .56  .99  1.28
Ghana  .22  .29  .31  .39
Greece  1.79  1.98  1.97  1.98
India  .045  .038  .039  .083
Indonesia  1.04  1.32  1.47  1.87
Kenya  .54  .18  .05  .02
Korea, Rep. of  .37  .53  .25  .25
Madagascar  .69  .45  .68  1.13
Malaysia  4.98  8.00  7.38  8.67
Mexico  1.50  2.64  2.85  3.12
Nigeria  1.54  1.78  2.12  2.48
Pakistan  .55  .55  .53  .79
Panama  -.33  -.69  -.01  -.73
Peru  .17  -.03  .52  1.58
Philippines,  the  1.21  1.25  .52  2.02
Portugal  5.47  5.02  3.22  2.73
Singapore  19.89  16.43  20.60  19.06
Spain  4.25  3.25  2.28  1.45
Thailand  3.09  2.35  2.27  2.78
Turkey  .77  .90  .88  .59
Uruguay  0  0  .01  .98
Venezuela  .80  3.09  .93  .68
Note: FDI flows are normalized by the import price deflator. Percentages  are in whole numbers rather than fractions.
23Table 3: Descriptive  Statistics
Variable  Low FDI  High FDI  |  Source
Countries  Countries
Real FDI as a Percentage  .50  2.37  World  Debt  Tables
of GDP (RFDI)  World  Bank
Real GDP per capita  12.89  23.76  World  Debt  Tables
(GDPCAP)  (.05)  (.45)  World Bank
(hundreds of dollars)
Annual GDP Growth (percent)  3.90  5.22  World  Debt  Tables
(GDP%)  (.  10)  (.21)  World Bank
Real Earnings per  132.19  131.30  World  Debt  Tables
Worker  (1970 =100)  (.06)  (.31)  World  Bank
(EARN)
Real Exports as percentage  20.19  35.00  World  Debt Tables
of GDP (Exports  (.1  1)  (.82)  World Bank
Manufacturing  Exports  4.00  11.51  World  Debt  Tables
as percentage of GDP (MFEXP)  (.01)  (.80)  World Bank
Primary Exports  9.26  10.78  World  Debt  Tables
as a percentage of GDP (PPEXP)  (0.05)  (0.34)  World Bank
Debt  Equity  .25  .20  World  Debt  Tables
Swaps/Restructuring  (.18)  (.01)  World  Bank
as a percentage of  Long-Term
Debt  (DSWAP)
Political Risk  43.54  49.12  BERi, S.A.
Index (PRI)  (.15)  (.611)
Work Days lost as a percentage  4.30  2.20  ILO Annual Reports
of  GDP (WDL)  (-.22)  (-.12)
Operation Risk Index (ORI)  43.62  50.51  BERI, S.A.
l __________________________________  (.05)  (.67)
Tax on Trade and  17.06%  16.51%  GOVT.  FINANCE
Int. Transactions as a percentage  (-.09)  (-.10)  STATISTICS,  IMF.
Relative to Tax
Revenue. (ITAX)
Note: Mean values of the country  groupings are on the top line. The Pearson correlation coefficient  with RFDI
(based on annual observations) is in parenthesis.  Percentages are expressed as whole numbers rather than
fractions.
24Table 4: Correlation matrix of major variables
RFDI  GDP%  GDPCAP  DSWP  EARN  XRATE |  EXP. J  PRI  WDL  ORI J  ITAX
RFDI  I
GDP%  .17  .
GDPCAP  .57  -.06  1
DSWAP  -.02  .006  -.03  1
EARN  .11  .20  .23  .02  1
XRATE  -.11  .07  -.08  -02  .33  1
EXP.  .86  .22  .58  -.03  .19  -.04
PRI  .58  .11  .67  10  18  .02  72  1
WDL  -.19  -.18  .01  -.06  -.11  -.07  -.31  -.24  1
ORI  .60  .26  .60  -.13  .23  -.01  .71  .79  -. 14  1
ITAX  -15  .31  -.58  -. 08  -.13  -.21  -.22  -.41  03  -.24  _
Note: Correlation estimates are sensitive to the sample period. The values provided are relevant for the combined Model 3.
25Table 5: FDI and political risk index (PRI)
VARIABLE  Model 1  Model  2  Model 3'  Model 4  Model 5
Dep. var.  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI
Constant.  -1.52  -1.08
(-3.29)  (-2.65)
PRI  .021  .019  .02  .012  .02
(2.67)  (2.65)  (2.68)  (1.40)  (2.34)
TIME  .039  .04
(3.00)  (2.50)
GDP%  .018  .017  .017  .017  .015
(1.36)  (1.91)  (1.39)  (1.49)  (1.19)
GDPCAP  .0059  .00005  .0006  .0017  .0005
(1.41)  (.02)  (.17)  (.52)  (.12)
RFDII  .89  .84  .81  .74  .81
(13.88)  (10.73)  (10.26)  (9.06)  (11.18)
DSWAP  .015  .014  .016  .0067
(.17)  (.15)  (.18)  (.07)
EARN  -.0017  -.0018  -.0018  -.002
(-2.66)  (-2.36)  (-2.40)  (-2.61)
IPG7  .024  .017  .024
(3.50)  (2.87)  (3.63)
XRATE  -.00012  -.00011  -.00012
(-2.46)  (-2.31)  (-2.29)
DASIA  -2.89  -2.09  -2.75
(-3.59)  (-2.91)  (-3.61)
DLA  -3.01  -2.09  -2.90
(-3.48)  (-2.74)  (-3.54)
I  DAFRICA  -2.77  -1.82  -2.64
(-3.10)  (-2.45)  (-3.18)
DEUROPE  -2.96  -2.04  -2.88




Model  3  (1.78)
F-value  402.83  105.38  61.72  56.45  54.94
D.W.  2.60  2.13  2.11  2.10  2.07
Ad R'  I .84  .72  .72  .72  .73
Obs.  |  373  290  257  256  239
Note:  T-values are in parenthesis.
(a)  The Altemative Durbin test for Model 3 indicates a t-statistic of -.84 for the lagged error
term.
26Table  6: FDI and PRI (Subsample  analysis)
Low-FDI Countriesa|  High-FDI Countriesb
Model 2  Model 3  Model 2  Model 3
Dep.Var.  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI
Constant  -.38  -2.34
(-1.50)  (-2.36)
PRI  .0098  .01  .039  .051
(1.83)  (1.70)  (2.29)  (2.48)
TIME  .016  .07
(1.40)  (2.27)
GDP%  -.0018  .0074  .03  .007
(-.17)  (.46)  (1.72)  (.27)
GDPCAP  -.0031  -.01  -.004  .004
(-.73)  (-1.36)  (-.97)  (.70)
RFDII  .58  .53  .78  .71
(5.61)  (4.09)  (8.33)  (6.43)
DSWAP  5.43  3.49  .004  -.02
(1.77)  (1.01)  (.04)  (-.24)
EARN  -.00025  -.00016  -.0011  -.0033
(-.36)  (-.16)  (-.47)  (-1.35)
IPG7  .012  .04
(2.25)  (3.12)
XRATE  .00001  -.0003
(.53)  (-.58)
DASIA  -1.36  -5.47
(-2.65)  (-3.26)
DLA  -1.13  -5.56
(-2.24)  (-3.25)
DAFRICA  -1.38  -4.68
(-2.59)  (-2.99)
DEUROPE  -1.40  -5.90
(-2.61)  (-3.21)
F-Value  27.20  10.82  40.11  27.61
D.W  1.95  1.95  2.13  2.03
Obs.  163  130  127  127
Ad. R2  0.44  .45  0.68  .70
Note PRI Data  for each country  is for 1978-93,  except  Bolivia  (1979-85),  Kenya  (1978-85)  and China  (1986-93).
(a)  Low-FDI  countries  are Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  India,  Indonesia,  Kenya,  the Republic  of Korea,
Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines.  Turkey,  and Venezuela.
(b)  High-FDI  countries  are, China,  Colombia.  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Greece,  Malaysia,  Mexico, Portugal,  Spain,
and  Thailand.
27Table 7: FDI and work days lost  (WDL)
Variable  Model 1  J  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
Dep Var  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI
Constant.  -.07  -.07
(-.40)  (.39)
WDL  -.0038  -.0072  -.0097  .0017  -012
(-.94)  (-1.32)  (-1.56)  (.26)  (-1.7))
TIME  .01  .016
(1.86)  (1.79)
GDPO/o  .008  .02  .014  .01  .011
(.69)  (1.49)  (.91)  (.61)  (.70)
GDPCAP  .005  .011  .015  -.0036  .016
(2.85)  (2.11)  (2.57)  (-.49)  (2.67)
RFDII  .82  .87  .84  .76  .83
(17.35)  (13.29)  (12.76)  (11.57)  (11.85)
DSWAP  .021  .025  .02  .02
(2.27)  (2.46)  (2.51)  (2.43)
EARN  -.0014  -.0019  -.0009  -.0021
(-2.46)  (-2.26)  (-1.20)  (-2.5)
IPG7  .013  .011  .015
___________  ___________  ____________  (2.50)  (2.51)  (2.91)
XRATE  -.00006  -.00017  -.00007
(-.99)  (-2.17)  (-1.1)
DASIA  -1.06  -1.44  -1.32
___________  __________  ___________  (-1.86)  (-2.67)  (-2.14)
DLA  -1.35  -1.59  -1.68
(-2.16)  (-2.70)  (-2.49)
DAFRICA  -1.08  -1.42  -1.27
(-1.92)  (-2.54)  (-2.1)
DEUROPE  -1.22  -1.21  -1.49




Model 3  (.12)
F-value  161.67  96.95  57.24  53.63  49.70
D.W.  2.22  2.08  2.11  2.10  2.04
Ad. R  .69  .73  .72  .73  .72
Obs.  368  248  238  237  225
Note:  T-values  are  in parenthesis.  Models  are  reported  after  first-order  autocorrelation
correction.  Most  countries have missing observations  - data where  available  are from
1972-92.  See notes on table 8 for the list of countries.
28Table 8: FDI and  WDL (sub-sample analysis)
Low FDI countries"  High-FDI countrieSb
Variable  MODEL 2  MODEL 3  MODEL 2  MODEL 3
Dep.var.  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI
Constant  .23  -.53
(1.42)  (-1.06)
WDL  -.011  -.0089  -.07  .024
(-2.30)  (-1.76)  (-1.11)  (.33)
Time  .004  .02
________________  (.57)  _  (1.27)
GDPO/o  -.01  -.01  .072  .06
(-.72)  (-.61)  (3.19)  (2.38)
GDPCAP  -.005  -.009  .026  .010
(-.82)  (-1.69)  (2.68)  (2.80)
RFDHI  .51  .46  .82  .67
(4.49)  (4.06)  (10.61)  (6.65)
DSWAP  5.18  4.34  .024  .02
(1.64)  (1.08)  (2.40)  (1.88)
EARN  .00064  .0009  -.0012  -.0014
_____________  H(.96)  (1.02)  (-.51)  (-.62)
IPG7  .00068  .005
__________________  ________________  (.13)  (.59)
XRATE  .00008  .00042
(1.68)  (.68)
DASIA  .14  -1.48
_______________  ____________  _ 1 (.27)  (-1.44)
DLA  .39  -2.22
_______________  ____________  _  1 (.69)  (-2.00)
DAFRICA  .27  -.92
(.49)  (-.91)
DEUROPE  .16  -4.27
.31  (-2.94)
F-value  12.71  7.20  35.59  23.71
D.W  2.11  2.12  2.07  2.02
Obs.  151  141  97  97
Ad.R2 0.35  .32  0.72  0.72
Nitk:  T-values are in parentheses.
(a)  Low-FDI countries are Chile, India, Indonesia. Kenya, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Panama,
Peru, the Philippines, Turkey.
(b)  High-FDI countries are Costa Rica Ecuador, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Portugal, and Thailand. Most
countries have missing observations.  Data availability varies for each country where available, data
is from 1972-92.
29Table 9: FDI and operation risk index (ORI)
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5
Dep.var.  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI
Constant.  -1.26  -.72
(-3.45)  (-2.81)
ORI  .022  .019  .019  007  .016
(3.01)  (3.28)  (3.23)  (1.  19)  (2.30)
Time  .028  .03
(2.93)  (2.76)
GDPCAP  .009  .0017  .005  .0038  .0015
(2.32)  (.81)  (1.17)  (.95)  (.35)
RFDII  .83  .65  .61  .52  .76
(12.83)  (6.32)  (5.82)  (5.17)  (9.30)
DSWAP  .047  .04  .039  .02
(.60)  (.50)  (.51)  (.27)
EARN  -.0017  -.0018  -.0021  -.0014
(-2.85)  (-2.55)  (-2.84)  (-2.0)
IPG7  .018  .013  .022
.__________ l(3.08)  (2.40)  (3.33)
XRATE  -.0001  -.00014  -.00012
(-1.81)  (-2.17)  (-2.1)
DASIA  -1.89  -1.44  -2.38
(-3.45)  (-2.82)  (-3.6)
DLA  -1.98  -1.40  -2.58
(-3.33)  (-2.49)  (-3.44)
DAFRICA  -1.53  -.97  -2.12
(-2.41)  (-1.66)  (-2.72)
DEUROPE  -1.99  -1.33  -2.37




Model 3  (.58)
F-value  451.39  76.09  41.77  43.53  52.08
D.W.a-  2.30  1.82  1.80  1.82  1.96
Ad. R'  .80  .56  .57  .60  .66
Obs.  443  351  308  307  290
Note: T-values are in parenthesis.
(a)  The alternative  Durbin Statistic for Model 3 indicates a t-statistic of 0.52 for the lagged
error tern.  For list of countries and data availability, see the notes in table 10.
30Table 10: FDI and ORI (sub-sample analysis)
Low FDI countries"  High-FDI  countries  bl
Variable  l
Model 2  Model 3  Model 2  Model 3
Dep.var.  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI
Constant  .13  -1.22
(.62)  (-1.85)
ORI  .0062  .008  .02  .018
(1.19)  (1.04)  (1.84)  (1.88)
Time  .003  .045
(.24)  (2.45)
GDPCAP  -.0037  -.02  -.0011  .002
(-.77)  (-1.56)  (-.39)  (.28)
RFDII  .19  .12  .75  .68
(1.72)  (1.12)  (7.86)  (7.23)
DSWAP  7.77  5.71  .003  -.03
(2.06)  (1.35)  (.04)  (-.32)
EARN  .00002  .0008  .0005  -.0023
_  _  _  (.03)  (.79)  (.22)  (-1.09)
IPG7  .0057  .03
l______________  (.71)  (3.83)
XRATE  .00009  -.0011
(2.15)  (-2.14)
DASIA  -.59  -3.01
(-.79)  (-3.36)
DLA  -.12  -3.27
(-.16)  (-3.82)
DAFRICA  -.16  -2.73
(-.21)  (-2.74)
DEUROPE  -.63  -3.15
(-.90)  (-3.88)
F-value  4.94  3.60  49.78  32.71
D.W  1.58  1.57  1.93  1.94
Obs.  200  157  151  151
Adj.R2 | 0.11  .14  0.66  .68
Note: T-values are in parenthesis.
(a)  Low-FDI countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil. Chile, India, Indonesia, Kenya, the Republic of
Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela.
(b)  High- FDI countries are Ecuador, China, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria,
Portugal,  Singapore,  Spain,  and Thailand.  ORI data  for each  country  spans 1975-93,  except  for
Bolivia  and Kenya  (1975-85)  and China  (1986-93).
31Table 11: FDI and taxes on international trade  (ITAX)
Variable  Model I  Model2  Model 3  Model4  Model5
Dep.  var.  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI
Constant  .65  -.82
(2.04)  (-2.89)
ITAX  -.02  .011  .015  .012  .01
(-1.40)  (2.73)  (3.17)  (2.23)  (1.81)
Time  .09  .012  .013
(4.01)  (1.45)  (1.50)
GDPCAP  .0078  .0053  .007  .006
(2.93)  (1.79)  (2.13)  (1.98)
GDPO/o  .004  .007  .006  .0028
(.24)  (.40)  (.28)  (.13)
EXPORTS  .019  .024  .024  .024
(3.88)  (4.43)  (4.51)  (4.51)
RFDII  .73  .71  .66  .67
(10.91)  (10.11)  (8.66)  (8.80)
EARN  -.0015  -.002
______________  ____________  ____________  (-1.95)  (-1.99)
IPG7  .014  .014
(2.63)  (2.61)
XRATE  -.00007  -.00008
.__________  __________  (-1.72)  (-1.8)
DASIA  -1.14  -2.12  -2.01
(-3.56)  (-3.07)  (-2.95)
DLA  -.95  -2.09  -2.01
(-3.05)  (-2.95)  (-2.88)
DAFRICA  -.52  -1.36  -1.23
.___________  __________  (-1.04)  (-1.59)  (-1.47)
DEUROPE  -.73  -1.84  -1.75
(-2.91)  (-2.99)  (-2.88)
Residual  .02
Model 3  (1.37)
F-value  11.03  384.92  259.40  187.84  172.49
D.W.  .18  2.23  2.21  2.22  2.22
Ad. R2 .05  .86  .86  .86  .86
Obs.  374  363  363  320  320
Note  T-values are in parenthesis. The models are corrected for first-order autocorrelation. See notes
of table 9 for information about countries included in the sample.
32Table 12: FDI and ITAX (sub-sample analysis)
Low-FDI  countries'.  High-FDI  countries  b-
Variable  l
Model 3  Model  4  Model  3  Model  4
Dep.var.  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI  RFDI
ITAX  -.01  -.0068  .023  .03
(-1.74)  (-1.06)  (2.10)  (2.11)
TIME  .018  .04
(1.58)  (3.27)
GDPCAP  -.008  -.01  .01  .011
(-1.16)  (-.96)  (2.05)  (2.39)
GDPGROW  .012  .016  .05  .032
(.64)  (.85)  (2.35)  (1.26)
RFDII  .40  .35  .69  .67
(3.29)  (3.00)  (7.87)  (6.77)
EARN  .0013  -.0025
(1.06)  (-.74)
EXPORTS  .0002  -.0024  .023  .025
(.02)  (-.19)  (4.42)  (4.57)
IPG7  .0035  .034
(.39)  (3.80)
XRATE  .00005  -.0029
(.69)  (-2.16)
DASIA  .23  -.27  -2.10  -5.00
l_______________ (.49)  (-.25)  (-3.74)  (-3.90)
DLA  .43  .23  -1.49  -4.25
-l____________  |(.75)  (.17)  (-3.68)  (-3.93)
DAFRICA  -1.51  -4.24
(-2.36)  (-3.13)
DEUROPE  .16  -.22  -1.53  -4.00
(.65)  (-.22)  (-3.99)  (-4.13)
F-value  6.27  3.68  194.22  145.76
D.W.  2.19  2.20  2.11  2.15
Obs.  172  151  191  169
Ad. R2  0.05  .02  0.90  .90
Note:  T-values  are in parenthesis.
(a)  Low-FDI  countries  are Chile, India,  Indonesia,  the Republic  of Korea,  Pakistan,
Panama,  Turkey,  Uruguay.
(b)  High-FDI  countries  are Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Egypt,  Greece,  Malaysia,  Mexico,
Portugal,  Spain,  and Thailand. Most  countries  have  missing  observations.  Available
data  spans  form 1972-93.  The models  are corrected  for first-order  autocorrelation.
33Table 13: Exports in low and high-FDI countries
[Exports  Manuf.  Exports  Primary  Exports
Variable  High-FDI  Low-FDI  High-FDI  Low-FDI  High-FDI  |  Low-FDI
Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries  Countries  j Countries
EXPORTS  .02  .0046
(4.62)  (.87)
MFEXPa.  .039  .009
(4.80)  (.82)
PPEXPa  .019  .0053
(1.34)  (.27)
GDPCAP  .013  -.009  .006  -.01  .033  -.008
(2.78)  (-1.48)  (1.30)  (-1.43)  (2.45)  (-1.31)
GDP%  -.004  .008  .01  .009  -.0034  .01
(-.17)  (.68)  (.44)  (.78)  (-.12)  (.79)
RFDII  .63  .25  .63  .22  ..74  .22
(9.50)  (2.96)  (10.20)  (2.82)  (5.71)  (2.77)
EARN  .0002  .0011  -.0009  .001  .0013  .0012
(.08)  (1.40)  (-.42)  (1.35)  (.42)  (1.55)
IPG7  .019  .0003  .02  .0014  .019  .0026
(2.94)  (.05)  (4.23)  (.26)  (2.29)  (.50)
DASIA  -2.32  .01  -1.94  -.04  -1.94  -.16
(-2.89)  (.04)  (-2.69)  (-.09)  (-2.63)  (-.35)
DEUROPE  -2.51  .36  -2.16  .39  -2.26  .14
(-3.59)  (.77)  (-3.56)  (.69)  (-2.54)  (.26)
DAFRICA  -1.94  .06  -1.48  .19  -1.67  .01
(-2.56)  (.15)  (-2.09)  (.37)  (-2.07)  (.02)
DLAMERICA  -2.95  .08  -2.41  .04  -3.28  -.12
(-4.26)  (.21)  (-4.08)  (.10)  (-2.71)  (-.25)
Ad. R 2 .89  .10  .90  .08  .81  .08
F-value  192.67  4.94  215.28  3.84  107.15  3.82
Obs.  203  305  202  290  213  290
D.Watson  1.81  2.11  1.89  2.14  2.27  2.14
Note: T-values are in parenthesis. The models for high-FDI countries (with EXPORTS and MFEXP) are reported after
correcting  for first-order  autocorrelation.
(a)  Share of GDP.
34Table 14: Causality tests for exports
(high-FDI countries)
Causality tests for general exports
Country  F-test value  F-test value
(exports to FDI)  (FDI to exports)
Colombia  .71  1.03
Costa Rica  2.28  1.07
Ecuador  4.40  1.01
Egypt  .85  1.38
Greece  2.73a  1.29
Malaysia  2.47  .96
Mexico  1.42  0.98
Nigeria  1.94  0.40
Portugal  4.53b  0.95
Singapore  2.86^  3.67
Spain  0.28  0.26
Thailand  8.46c  1.33
Pooled model  19.21'c  4.16 b.
(Ecuador, Malaysia,
Portugal, Thailand)
Causality Tests for Manufacturing  Exports
Country  F-value  F-value
Manuf. Exp. to FDI  FDI to Mauf. Exp.
Ecuador  7.12  c  1.17
Greece  2.80 a  2.38
Portugal  9.10 C  .93
Singapore  5.63 b.  3.61 L
Thailand  2.30  0.17
Pooled model for  26.46  C  2.78  '
five countries  I
Note. The individual  country and combined  tests include three lags. The individual  country
results should be interpreted  with caution, because  of the small sample size. Botswana  and
China are high-FDI countries  that could not be analyzed  because of an incomplete  data set.
(a)  Significant  at I percent level.
(b)  Significant  at 5 percent level
(c)  Significant  at 10 percent level
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Methodological note
Three approaches  were employed to analyze the determinants of FDI flows.
1.  Micro-oriented econometric studies
These studies  are  conducted at  the firm or industry  level,  particularly  in  industries that  are
regarded as "foot-loose," such as electronics.  Since the decision to invest is a corporate-level
decision, these disaggregate studies are useful for capturing the complexity of industry-specific
determinants of FDI  flows.  But, although most  studies employ a dependent  variable that is
sector-specific (usually at a two-or three-digit SIC code), the explanatory variables have country-
specific dimensions.
For example, Woodward and Rolfe (1993) analyzed the location determinants of export-
oriented foreign direct investment in the Caribbean Basin.  The study employed  187 new plant
investments based on U.S. Department of Commerce data as the dependent variable and various
country-specific aggregate variables, such as per capita GNP, political stability, availability of
free trade zones, manufacturing concentration, and land area, as explanatory variables.  Thus,
these  types  of  studies  are  not  fully  micro-oriented  and  may fail  to  capture  the  investment
decisions that are based on regional considerations.  Firm-specific studies that are carried out on
a case-by-case basis are in a better position to incorporate the micro-decision process, but are
difficult to generalize in terms of the overall implications for a developing economy.
2.  Survey  Data Analysis
Studies based on survey data that analyze the key motivations of global investors are ideally
suited for studying qualitative factors that may be difficult to incorporate into an econometric
model.  A good example of this approach is Rolfe, et al (1993).
In this study a four-page questionnaire was sent out to U.S.-based managers of companies
with  international  investments.  The managers  were  asked  to  rank  twenty  specific  incentive
schemes.  The results indicated that corporate managers placed a high value on not restricting
intercompany payments and dividend remittances.  The general disadvantage of these studies is
the  inherent  limitations  of survey  data analysis, particularly the  sensitivity  of the  subjective
responses to the  structure and  style of the survey instrument (for a  good discussion of these
issues, see Wallsten, 1980).
363.  Aggregate Econometric Studies
Aggregate  statistical  studies  attempt to  evaluate  country-specific determinants of  the  overall
trends in FDI flows.  By analyzing data at the macroeconomic level, these studies can provide
insights  about  the  type  of  structural  characteristics  and  macroeconomic  policies  that  may
encourage  FDI  flows.  But,  because  it  is  difficult  to  incorporate  firm-or  industry-level
determinants  in these macro-oriented studies, the aggregate relationships  capture only  broad,
long-term trends.
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